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1919 
Article 
Four Ironies of Campus Climate 
Richard Delgado† & Jean Stefancic†† 
  INTRODUCTION   
One of the central issues in the campus-climate controver-
sy1 is hate speech,2 including verbal microaggressions.3 Alt-
 
†  John J. Sparkman Chair of Law, The University of Alabama School of 
Law; J.D., U.C.-Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); A.B., University of Wash-
ington. 
†† Professor and Clement Research Affiliate, The University of Alabama 
School of Law; M.A., University of San Francisco. Copyright © 2017 by Rich-
ard Delgado & Jean Stefancic. 
 1. On the controversy over campus climate, see for example, Sarah 
Brown et al., At the End of a Watershed Year, Can Student Activists Sustain 
Momentum?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 24, 2016), http://www.chronicle 
.com/article/At-the-End-of-a-Watershed/236577; Katherine Mangan, Mizzou 
Incident Rekindles Anger over Treatment of Black Students, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Mizzou-Incident 
-Rekindles/237929; Beth McMurtrie, U. of Chicago’s Free-Expression Letter 
Exposes Fault Lines on Campus, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 2, 2016), http:// 
www.chronicle.com/article/U-of-Chicago-s/237672; Stephanie Saul, Campuses 
Cautiously Train Freshmen Against Subtle Insults, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/us/campuses-cautiously-train-freshmen 
-against-subtle-insults.html. 
 2. On this component of the campus-climate movement and controversy, 
see Saul, supra note 1; Geoffrey Stone, Free Expression in Peril, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Free 
-Expression-in-Peril/237568; Fernanda Zamudio-Suarez, U. of Mississippi 
Students Stage Sit-in over Racist Social-Media Post, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 
(Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/u-of-mississippi 
-students-stage-sit-in-over-racist-social-media-post/114638.  
 3. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: 
AN INTRODUCTION 1–3, 167 (2d ed. 2012) (explaining the term); Chester 
Pierce, Psychiatric Problems of the Black Minority, in AMERICAN HANDBOOK 
OF PSYCHIATRY 512, 520 (Silviano Arieti ed., 2d ed. 1974); Peggy Davis, Law 
as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1565 (1989). On the role 
microaggressions play in the campus climate movement, see Saul, supra note 
1; Peter Schmidt, Campaigns Against Microaggressions Prompt Big Concerns 
About Free Speech, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 9, 2015), http://www.chronicle 
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hough the controversy encompasses many other issues—such 
as safe spaces,4 trigger warnings by classroom teachers,5 cur-
ricular coverage of topics of particular interest to minorities,6 
fraternity parties that feature blackface or other odious sym-
bols,7 renaming buildings,8 and hiring more minority profes-
sors9—hate speech is apt to be the most long-lasting and intrac-
table of the areas in contention.10 
 
.com./article/Campaigns-Against/231459?; Stone, supra note 2. 
 4. See, e.g., Sarah Brown, The Real Story Behind the U. of Connecticut’s 
“Scholars House,” CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www 
.chronicle.com/article/The-Real-Story-Behind-the-U/237571; Sarah Brown & 
Katherine Mangan, What “Safe Spaces” Really Look Like on College Campus-
es, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/ 
What-Safe-Spaces-Really/237720; Pete Grieve, University to Freshmen: Don’t 
Expect Safe Spaces or Trigger Warnings, CHI. MAROON (Aug. 24, 2016), https:// 
www.chicagomaroon.com/2016/08/24/university-to-freshmen-dont-expect-safe 
-spaces-or-trigger-warnings (discussing a letter from the University of Chica-
go’s dean of students advising incoming students that the university will not 
coddle them or provide safe spaces where they will be free from disagreeable 
messages and ideas); George Will, The Specter of the “Safe Space” Is Haunting 
College Campuses, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/opinions/the-specter-of-the-safe-space-is-haunting-college-campuses/ 
2016/10/19/c4bb7828-9548-11e6-bb29-bf2701dbe0a3_story.html. 
 5. See McMurtrie, supra note 1. 
 6. See Jack Kerwick, Professor Declares “Whiteness” a “Disease”: Preach-
ing Hate in Higher Education, FRONTPAGE MAG. (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www 
.frontpagemag.com/fpm/260875/professor-declares-whiteness-disease-jack 
-kerwick (noting that this trend may have gone too far); see also Saul, supra 
note 1 (urging sensitivity training for faculty and students). 
 7. See Thomas Bartlett, An Ugly Tradition Persists at Southern Fraterni-
ty Parties, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 30, 2001), http://www.chronicle.com/ 
article/An-Ugly-Tradition-Persists-at/21032. 
 8. See Jonathan Holloway & John F. Witt, Symbols and Speech: An Intel-
lectual Framework for the Debate over Renaming Campus Buildings, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/ 
SymbolsSpeech/238712. 
 9. See Sarah Brown, Tenure Denials Set Off Alarm Bells, and a Book, 
About Minority Hiring, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www 
.chronicle.com/article/Tenure-Denials-Set-Off-Alarm/238100 (describing con-
troversies over minority hiring and tenure decisions and noting that a number 
of universities have taken measures to improve their record in these areas, 
some of them prompted by campus protests and petitions). 
 10. The two of us are living proof of this last statement, having addressed 
this topic regularly for over thirty years. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN 
STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE 
NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UN-
DERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND (2004) [hereinafter DELGADO, UNDER-
STANDING WORDS]; Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitution-
al Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, 
Narratives in Collision]; Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action 
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One reason is that although the social norm against hate 
speech is now relatively well established, the legal version is 
not. Thirty years ago, it was possible to say, “what Jones said 
just now was hate speech, all right. What of it?” Today it is not. 
Almost everyone condemns it11—except the legal system.12 This 
divergence, with society at large believing one thing and the le-
gal system quite another, means that many conversations fea-
ture speakers talking past one another.13 
This anomaly—the first of four ironies that we highlight in 
this Article—is especially marked with regard to campus hate 
speech and probably accounts for much of the lack of progress 
in coming to terms on which both sides of the controversy could 
agree. Most colleges and universities are strongly motivated to 
maintain an environment that is friendly to students of color, 
women, and sexual minorities.14 This stands to reason, for 
 
for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 
(1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words That Wound].  
 11. Almost to a fault. To many on the right, we have gone too far in this 
direction and are, in fact, an overly politically correct society in which one 
cannot say anything controversial or critical having to do with race. Compare 
John C. Knechtle, When To Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PA. ST. L. REV. 539, 
542–43 (2006) (arguing the need for hate speech regulation because of the 
widespread persecution and discrimination of minorities throughout history), 
with Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Pro-
posal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 489 (“Because civil libertarians have learned that 
free speech is an indispensable instrument for the promotion of other rights 
and freedoms—including racial equality—we fear that the movement to regu-
late campus expression will undermine equality, as well as free speech.”), and 
Catherine Rampell, Liberal Intolerance Is on the Rise on America’s College 
Campuses, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/liberal-but-not-tolerant-on-the-nations-college-campuses/2016/02/11/ 
0f79e8e8-d101-11e5-88cd-753e80cd29ad_story.html (discussing a study show-
ing that liberal-minded students are more likely to be willing to shut down 
speech they find offensive), and Stone, supra note 2 (arguing that university 
dialogue requires an open exchange of ideas). 
 12. See, e.g., UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1181 
(E.D. Wis. 1991) (holding that freedom of speech concerns outweigh problems 
of bigotry and discrimination); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 858, 867 
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding the conduct policy too vague to adequately support 
free speech at a public institution). 
 13. For example: Speaker A says, “Hate speech is so tacky. I can’t believe 
that those fraternity kids did what they did.” Speaker B responds, “What’s the 
matter? Don’t you believe in free speech? It’s the cornerstone of democracy. Of 
all places, universities should be bastions of it.” See Jesse McCarthy, The Long 
Grudge: A History of White Resentment of Blacks Since the Civil War, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2016, at SS2-18 (noting that white resentment of minority 
groups is generating a backlash that emerges after gains in civil rights move-
ments). 
 14. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: 
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many campus administrators are committed to the goal of edu-
cating students for roles in a multicultural and multiracial 
world, and if the campus is cold or hostile, this goal will be dif-
ficult to achieve.15 
At a number of campuses, this commitment has taken the 
form of official policies condemning speech and remarks that 
would make these students feel oppressed and unwelcome. Be-
ginning about twenty years ago, campuses began instituting 
campus conduct codes or freestanding rules discouraging such 
remarks.16 These rules quickly came under fire by free-speech 
organizations,17 invariably with the same result: the courts 
struck them down as infringing the First Amendment.18 
The string of defeats did not deter many universities, 
which responded by enacting more narrowly tailored rules in 
hopes of avoiding judicial rejection.19 Many of these second-
generation rules met the same fate.20 Still, over 200 universities 
have such rules on the books, in clear defiance of judicial prec-
edent, thereby evincing their concern that the campus climate 
be as civil as possible, or at least devoid of the worst forms of 
racial or sexual harassment and invective.21 
I.  THE FIRST IRONY: A GROWING PUBLIC NORM AT 
ODDS WITH A TIME-HONORED LEGAL NARRATIVE   
We call the above disparity the first irony of campus hate 
speech—namely, that the law in action is radically different 
from the law on the books. University presidents and adminis-
trators believe in one norm and the courts believe in another. 
The administrators outnumber the judges and, until the Su-
preme Court issues a broad ruling, are likely to continue to ig-
nore lower-court rulings in other jurisdictions, believing that 
doing so is necessary to their mission of maintaining a happy, 
 
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN COL-
LEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 252 (1998). 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 10, at 344. 
 17. Organizations like the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education 
and the ACLU have challenged such codes. See Strossen, supra note 11, at 
492.  
 18. See id. at 501–04. 
 19. See JON B. GOULD, SPEAK NO EVIL: THE TRIUMPH OF HATE-SPEECH 
REGULATION 20–21 (2005) (describing the large number of campuses that have 
enacted such rules). 
 20. Id. at 77–79. 
 21. Id. at 76. 
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diverse community that will contribute to the kind of peaceful, 
multiracial society that campus leaders aspire to as a matter of 
faith.22 The administrators cite Grutter v. Bollinger23 and com-
mon sense in support of their position.24 For them, minority 
students and young women are at a formative age in their de-
velopment and, in many cases, lack either the critical mass or 
powerful allies to defend themselves from a tide of 
microaggressions and insults.25 Unless campus leaders make 
plain that hateful speech and behavior are out of bounds, these 
students will not flourish. 
The administrators thus take action of the kinds men-
tioned above.26 This, of course, frustrates free-speech absolut-
ists, who cannot understand why campuses continue to defy 
their favorite value. For their part, the defenders of campus 
hate-speech codes deplore the refusal of U.S. courts to realize 
that societal norms have changed, as they have in many other 
countries.27 
 
 22. See Diversity in Academe, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 27, 2014), 
http://www.chronicle.com/section/Diversity-in-Academe-2014/799 (listing sev-
eral articles demonstrating administrators’ dedication to fostering diverse 
student bodies); Jennifer Newton, Texas A&M University Apologizes to High 
School Visitors after They Were Racially Abused by Students as They Toured 
Campus, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article 
-3452573/Texas-M-University-apologizes-High-school-visitors-racially-abused 
-students-toured-campus.html. 
 23. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding affirmative action policy at University 
of Michigan Law School as necessary to create a diverse legal profession and 
citizenry). 
 24. See Mark G. Yudof & Rachel F. Moran, Race-Conscious Admissions 
Policies Face More Tests After ‘Fisher,’ CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 17, 2016), 
http://www.chronicle.com/article/Race-Conscious-Admissions/237151. 
 25. See Saul, supra note 1. 
 26. For example, administrators take action by instituting safe spaces, 
sensitivity training and courses, hate-speech rules, and changes in the curricu-
la. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text. 
 27. See, e.g., TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, FREE SPEECH: TEN PRINCIPLES FOR A 
CONNECTED WORLD (2016) (discussing legal protection for this value in other 
countries and societies); DELGADO, UNDERSTANDING WORDS, supra note 10, at 
195; JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 13–14 (2012). For a dis-
cussion on how students and administrators in other countries are struggling 
with campus-climate issues, see for example, Eve Fairbanks, The Global Face 
of Student Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2015, at SR4. 
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A. THE SHAPE OF THE DEBATE: FOUR IRONIES 
Although we have taken a side in the past,28 we do not do 
so in this Article. Instead, we consider some general features of 
the debate over campus climate, hate speech in particular, be-
ginning with brief remarks on First Amendment formalism. We 
do this because the rather extreme version of it that pervades 
that area of discourse today seems responsible for much of the 
stasis—the inability to progress—that we see in the campus-
hate-speech debate, including the four ironies of our title.29 
After describing the three remaining ironies and noting 
how all four block productive conversation and exchange,30 we 
return to the issue of formalism with which we began and offer, 
as diplomatically as possible, a suggestion for those remaining 
First Amendment absolutists who we see as standing in the 
way of progress in this area.31 We conclude by offering a few 
suggestions for how discussions may nevertheless proceed even 
if this group does not moderate its position.32 
B. FIRST AMENDMENT LEGAL FORMALISM 
As mentioned, First Amendment discourse remains mired 
in legal formalism nearly a century after the early realists 
brushed it aside and nearly three decades after critical legal 
studies showed its conceptual impossibility as a model for legal 
thought.33 Since one of us has elucidated this concept on a 
 
 28. Our sympathies lie with the faction advocating efforts to improve 
campus climate, including restraints on hate-speech. See, e.g., supra note 10. 
We do not advocate either position in this Article, but merely point out certain 
features of the debate that appear to be blocking progress. 
 29. That is, the gap between law and public sentiment. See supra notes 
22–27 and accompanying text (noting how much of the public now condemns 
hate speech, while courts routinely strike down controls on it). This gap alone 
accounts for much of the inability of the debate to progress beyond angry ar-
gument. Speaker A: “You don’t care.” Speaker B: “You’re the one who doesn’t 
care. What about free speech? And, those ridiculous safe spaces you’re always 
asking for would just reinstate segregation and Jim Crow.” 
 30. See supra Part I (noting a number of ironies that interfere with pro-
gress on the campus-climate issue, assuring that it is even less likely to come 
to a satisfactory resolution than the usual campus controversy, for example, 
about whether football players should receive more generous allowances for 
living expenses or whether graduate teacher assistants should be permitted to 
unionize). 
 31. See infra notes 74–115 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.  
 33. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. For a general discus-
sion of this progression, see Lucille A. Jewel, Old-School Rhetoric and New-
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number of occasions,34 we merely summarize it here. Essential-
ly, we believe that the unwavering approach that finds a home 
in First Amendment jurisprudence—almost alone—is largely 
responsible for the inability of the various sides to arrive at a 
resolution of the controversy over campus hate speech, a failure 
that has real, unfortunate consequences: it makes campus ad-
ministrators uncertain of what they can do, and can easily lead 
to self-righteous posturing by both sides, each certain, for dif-
ferent reasons, that they are correct.35 
This is paradoxical, for the First Amendment is said to be a 
principal tool that our political system uses to evaluate and fa-
cilitate change.36 Racial equity and multicultural values are 
hotly contested and under consideration right now,37 so that a 
frozen, inflexible view of free speech law is a serious obstacle to 
the search for a better America. Consider how this can and does 
happen. 
II.  IRONY NUMBER TWO: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLE OUT OF KEEPING WITH ITS OWN FOOTING   
When legal realism swept the law in the early years of the 
twentieth century, spelling the end to what realists such as 
Roscoe Pound called “mechanical jurisprudence,” one area that 
 
School Cognitive Science, 13 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 39, 55–61 (2016) (not-
ing that rights discourse, one kind of formalism, offers little of value to its in-
tended beneficiaries); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 
1363 (1984) (same). 
 34. E.g., Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism Is Giving Way to 
First Amendment Legal Realism, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169 (1994) [here-
inafter Delgado, Giving Way]; Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View 
of the First Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 778 (2000) (reviewing STEVEN 
SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANING OF AMERICA (1999)) [here-
inafter Delgado, Legal Realist View]. 
 35. That is, one camp believes (with some justification) that it has the law 
on its side while the other camp believes it has history on its side. 
 36. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELA-
TION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (examining the role of freedom of speech in 
a self-government political system) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, SELF-
GOVERNMENT]; Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 [hereinafter Meiklejohn, An Absolute] (noting that a 
key purpose of our system of free speech is to facilitate deliberative democra-
cy). Yet an absolutist position, on campus hate-speech rules for example, that 
refuses to take seriously other values can prematurely terminate that very de-
liberation. See infra notes 43–50 and accompanying text (explaining how this 
risk can set in). 
 37. See, e.g., supra notes 14–17, 22, and accompanying text. 
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survived the critical onslaught was the First Amendment.38 In 
that area alone, rigid generalizations (no content regulation), 
high-sounding platitudes (we must protect, most of all, the 
speech we hate), hidebound doctrinal boxes (speech versus ac-
tion), and thought-ending clichés (the best cure for bad speech 
is more speech) still hold sway.39 The realists introduced atten-
tion to empirical and multidisciplinary knowledge, the role of 
politics and social influence on judges and judging, and the 
need for balancing and taking into account competing perspec-
tives on any legal question.40 Legal realism paved the way for 
law and economics, critical legal studies, critical race theory, 
feminist theory, and a host of other legal movements that 
helped legal thought move beyond sterile doctrinal analysis, 
which pretended that every legal question had one right an-
swer.41 
It enabled the law to respond more flexibly to the needs of 
a modern, changing society and to benefit from the perspectives 
of a host of companion disciplines, such as the social sciences.42 
But little of this found a home in First Amendment theory, 
with the result that American law in this respect evokes won-
der in the minds of thoughtful judges and scholars in other 
parts of the world, including in nations, such as Canada and 
Australia, that in many respects pattern their legal system af-
ter ours.43 
Nowhere is this truer than with decisions having to do 
with hate speech and hate crime. One of two Supreme Court 
decisions that considered criminal prohibitions of cross-burning 
 
 38. See supra note 34. 
 39. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Southern Dreams and a New Theo-
ry of First Amendment Legal Realism, 65 EMORY L.J. 303, 304 (2015). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. In the law of contracting, realists showed, for example, how form 
contracts could frustrate the goal of freedom of contract. See, e.g., Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685, 1693 (1976); see also Karl N. Llewelyn, Some Realism About Realism: 
Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931) (noting the applica-
bility of the realists’ insight in a host of legal areas, including torts, business 
law, and the law of corporations); Note, Legal Realism and the Race Question: 
Some Realism About Realism on Race Relations, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1607 
(1995) (applying realism to the law of race relations). 
 43. See, e.g., R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. 697, 744 (noting that Canada 
patterns its system of free speech after ours but treats hate speech different-
ly); WALDRON, supra note 27, at 12–14 (noting that many other societies dis-
courage hate speech in their laws and official documents). 
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is a model of flexibility and thoughtful consideration. The au-
thor, Sandra Day O’Connor, begins the opinion with a several-
pages-long review of that practice as a form of racial intimida-
tion, and goes on to find a carefully crafted Virginia law, that 
forbids it, constitutional.44 A prior decision by the same court 
dealing with the identical practice under a St. Paul ordinance 
arrived at the opposite decision by a means so categorical and 
devoid of attention to realist concerns as to suggest an exercise 
in abstract algebra.45 Cases in federal and state courts striking 
down campus hate-speech rules in various universities exhibit 
much the same quality. Many strike down such rules under 
precedents having to do with theater marquees, overlooking 
that the two settings present radically different interests.46 
The debate about campus climate could benefit from the 
more flexible form of analysis which the early realists showed 
could improve practically every area of the law, ranging from 
torts to contracts, property, and most areas of constitutional 
law.47 Law was simply better, the realists argued, when judges 
and other lawmakers gave express consideration to history, so-
cial science, economics and policy on their way to rendering 
judgment in close cases with a great deal at stake. And it was 
certainly better if judges explicitly recognized that they were 
fallible human beings with preconceptions and political orien-
 
 44. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 45. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (noting that “a limited cat-
egorical approach has remained an important part of our First Amendment 
jurisprudence” and then proceeding to dispose of the case by attending only to 
the incident’s effects in light of the existing categorical system, including 
overbreadth, speech versus action, content discrimination, and various types 
of fighting words—with virtually no attention to cross-burning’s effects on real 
people, the fabric of society, the history of the practice, its social meaning, or 
the needs of a multiracial community such as St. Paul); cf. WALDRON, supra 
note 27 (urging attention to these other aspects of hate speech). 
 46. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 
475 U.S. 41 (1986), which stands for the idea that a city could prohibit the es-
tablishment of movie theatres in a residential community because the prohibi-
tion was aimed at mitigating a social evil—seedy movies—in a specific com-
munity on an across-the-board basis); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 39, at 
309 (noting the Court’s frequent use of incongruent precedents in First 
Amendment cases). 
 47. The benefits could include: the ability to balance competing interests 
and demands, including campus safety and the needs of a multicultural stu-
dent body; the ability to resolve the issue in light of the university’s basic in-
terests in educating all comers; and the ability to tap social science evidence 
on hate speech and the toll it takes on its targets. See, e.g., Delgado, Words 
That Wound, supra note 10 (discussing some of the harms of racism and of 
hate speech). 
  
1928 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1919 
 
tations, and made allowance for them in their decision-making 
process.48 
The abovementioned truncation constitutes the second iro-
ny of campus climate. The formalistic, clipped jurisprudence in 
this area is ironic because the First Amendment supposedly 
protects and encourages a full debate of important public is-
sues.49 But with campus hate speech, as with free speech in 
general, it does not. It assures exactly the opposite: cliché-
ridden argumentation and judicial opinions that give scant at-
tention to valid arguments that the other side may be advanc-
ing, and even less to social science, political science, history, or 
the demands of an emerging multiracial, multicultural socie-
ty.50 
 
 48. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 39. 
 49. See MEIKLEJOHN, SELF-GOVERNMENT, supra note 36, at 24–27; 
Meiklejohn, An Absolute, supra note 36, at 255; see also Richard Delgado & 
Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Er-
ror?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (1991) (noting the difficulty of following through on 
this promise). On the formalistic quality of much contemporary First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, see Delgado, Giving Way, supra note 34; Delgado, Legal 
Realist View, supra note 34. On the need for balancing in this area of dis-
course, see Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2016). 
 50. See Delgado, Giving Way, supra note 34, at 169–73; Delgado, Legal 
Realist View, supra note 34, at 778. For example, many closely contested free 
speech questions are not readily resolved by resort to earlier case law, but in-
stead would benefit from analysis under accepted social science knowledge on 
such issues as the effect of an empowered speaker on credibility or the manner 
in which certain speech (harsh belittlement, for example) can silence another 
speaker, resulting in less rather than more speech. See DELGADO & 
STEFANCIC, supra note 3, at 49–51, 65, 172; STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE 
TO AUTHORITY (1974); Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 
SCI. AM. 31 (1955). Recent social science examines confirmation bias, in which 
evidence or a statement that confirms a listener’s pre-existing beliefs or com-
mitments receives careful consideration, while speech that goes the other way 
merely generates skepticism and disbelief. See Shahram Heshmat, What Is 
Confirmation Bias?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www 
.psychologytoday.com/blog/science-choice/201504/what-is-confirmation-bias. By 
the same token, case law often ignores and cannot easily take account of how 
words can wound, see Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 10, and how 
hate speech (like most forms of racial revilement) is apt to be concerted, so 
that the victim is apt to have heard similar remarks many times before and 
thinks, “here we go again.” See Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 
10, at 383–86. 
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III.  IRONY NUMBER THREE: CAMPUS ADMINISTRATORS 
REASON IN A FORWARD-LOOKING MANNER, WHILE 
THEIR OPPONENTS HARKEN BACK TO PRECEDENT AND 
POLICY LAID DOWN IN EARLIER TIMES   
Another reason why controversies over campus hate speech 
persist and never come to a resolution lies in the radically dif-
ferent perspectives that the two sets of protagonists take. 
Campus administrators generally favor restraints on hate 
speech and action, believing that they are necessary to main-
taining a healthily diverse climate in which all can flourish. 
Their approach, in short, is pragmatic and forward looking. 
They value speech and a robust exchange of views but believe 
that in order to maximize that value they must first assure a 
variety of speakers and points of view, something that is un-
likely to come about until they are able to provide a campus 
atmosphere in which all contributors feel welcome and safe. 
Legal scholars, by contrast, may approach the very same 
issues from a backwards-looking perspective in which the dom-
inant question is what did we do in this or that case which we 
decided twenty-five years ago, when society was less diverse 
than it is now. Those cases might be ones in which Nazis 
sought to march in Skokie, or a movie theater operator sought 
permission to show pornographic movies in a quiet, middle-
class neighborhood.51 To the campus administrator merely try-
ing to get things to simmer down in time for finals, all these 
matters may seem beside the point. To the legal scholar, they 
may be the whole point; for such a person, the First Amend-
ment must be a seamless web—and if one-quarter of the blacks 
and Latinos on a campus transfer to Howard or UC-Riverside 
because of a torrent of hate mail, messages, and Confederate 
symbols, that is the price we pay for living in a free society. 
One camp, in short, looks forward, the other back. Since 
overt racism was more acceptable in earlier times than it is to-
day,52 the legal system is apt to have exhibited a higher tolera-
 
 51. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Col-
lin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). At least one prominent judge takes 
issue with formalism as the exclusive avenue for deciding cases, and opts in-
stead for a more pragmatic, open-textured approach. See Richard A. Posner, 
The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 23, 2012), https:// 
newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual 
-originalism. 
 52. Earlier times Indian massacres, slavery, Jim Crow, Chinese Exclu-
sion, the Bracero Program, and the internment of blameless Japanese Ameri-
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tion for it then than we believe is desirable today.53 Thus, the 
debate over forward- or backward-looking—pragmatic versus 
“principled”—perspectives and ways of reasoning is fraught 
with implications. This is one reason that the debate seems 
never to come to a happy end. Each side embeds a conclusion 
and a point of view in the very terms of the argument and the 
values and premises it deems acceptable. 
IV.  IRONY NUMBER FOUR: HEROES, METAPHORS, AND 
LESSONS FROM HISTORY   
Partly as a result of the predictable, stereotyped, dogmatic 
quality of the debate over hate speech and campus climate—
itself the product (on one side, anyway) of the high degree of le-
gal formalism that characterizes it—the debate makes little 
progress. The rhetorical gaps that pervade this area go beyond 
the usual tendency of advocates to want to make points by in-
voking high-sounding phrases and catchwords;54 they seem in-
stead to correspond to actual structures of belief. First 
Amendment absolutists not only talk about campus events, 
demonstrations, sit-ins, and prayer vigils using a different 
framework and set of images from those of the more pragmatic, 
policy-minded campus administrators who worry about keeping 
the peace and preserving the university’s image,55 they actually 
see those very same events differently. And of course the way 
they see and describe them differs even more radically from 
those of the student activists and faculty supporters who want 
to change the campus climate so as to make it more friendly to 
the multicultural crowd. 
A typical member of the free speech faction is apt to cite 
heroic figures such as Voltaire (“I may disagree with what you 
say but will defend to the death your right to say it”56), Galileo 
 
cans during World War II, for example. 
 53. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and the civil rights 
revolution focused attention on equality and nondiscrimination. Before then, 
the legal system produced a host of decisions that today seem almost incom-
prehensibly biased. See STEVEN W. BENDER, MEA CULPA: LESSONS ON LAW 
AND REGRET FROM U.S. HISTORY 135–37 (2015). 
 54. For example, one side may argue for human freedom and economic 
opportunity, while the other advocates mere efficiency and the desire to regu-
larize all of human behavior. 
 55. See supra notes 22–23, 33, 46, and accompanying text. 
 56. Biographer Evelyn Beatrice Hall formulated this phrase “to describe 
[Voltaire’s] attitude.” Steven Poole, A Beginner’s Guide to Voltaire, the Philos-
opher of Free Speech and Tolerance, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2015), https:// 
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(who stood up to Catholic orthodoxy), bookseller John Peter 
Zenger,57 and Clarence Darrow (who defended unpopular cli-
ents such as John Scopes, prosecuted for teaching evolution in 
a public school).58 Such a person is apt to deploy metaphors 
such as the marketplace of ideas59 or the notion of a system of 
free speech as a garment that must be protected against a sin-
gle rent. The catchwords and maxims of such a person (“the 
best cure for bad speech is more speech”; “we must protect the 
speech we hate as much as, or more than, the speech we love”; 
hate speech as a pressure valve)60 tend to cluster together too, 
as well as the lessons such a person draws from history (“[F]ree 
speech has been minorities’ best friend;” if they knew their own 
history, they would realize how unwise it is for them to be ar-
guing for speech-restriction now”).61 Of course, the campus-
climate protection side has its predictable parade of heroes 
(Martin Luther King, the early abolitionists),62 catch-words 
(implicit bias, microaggressions),63 metaphors (hate speech as 
silencing instrument),64 and maxims, too.65 
Each side deploys all these rhetorical tools against each 
other with varying degrees of certitude and impatience. The re-
sulting intransigence that affects both sides naturally limits 
productive discussion: How can one reason with a maxim or a 
catch-word? The devices close down discussion, which often 
they aim to do. How unsurprising then that the debate over 
campus climate never ends, or even advances much beyond a 
statement of the two initial positions.66 One has the law on its 
side, courtesy of First Amendment formalism and a very slow 
rate of change; the other has (or believes it has) history, whose 
 
www.theguardian.com/books/shortcuts/2015/jan/18/beginners-guide-voltaire 
-philosopher-free-speech-tolerance. 
 57. See Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 10, at 346–47. 
 58. People & Events: Clarence Darrow (1857–1938), PBS, http://www.pbs 
.org/wgbh/amex/monkeytrial/peopleevents/p_darrow.html (last visited Apr. 1, 
2017). 
 59. See Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied 
Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 
82 CAL. L. REV. 871, 883 (1994). 
 60. Id. at 876–86. 
 61. Id. at 877, 882–83. 
 62. Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 10, at 347. 
 63. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 64. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 65. “Words are important.” “Speech matters.” “Black lives matter.” 
 66. One side says we need more controls, while the other says there 
should be fewer. 
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arc, it thinks, bends in its direction.67 By their very nature, the-
se assertions are poorly calculated to help uncommitted listen-
ers evaluate their merits. 
V.  A CONCLUDING NOTE AND WARNING: TWO 
FALLACIES OF FORMALISM AND ONE OF LEGAL 
REALISM   
We now turn to the promised parting word about formal-
ism. As mentioned, we offer it in the nature of an advisory to 
the parties. To those with whom we have dueled in the past 
over First Amendment absolutism, we offer two reasons why 
they should temper their approach. One is methodological, hav-
ing to do with the approach one takes in thinking and speaking 
about the campus climate controversy, especially hate speech. 
The other is more personal, having to do with lawyers’ lives. In 
some respects, the two considerations merge. 
A. A METHODOLOGICAL ADMONITION: ACT IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH STRUCTURAL DUE PROCESS 
The methodological admonition is easy to state. Power 
alone, even the judicial kind taking the form of dozens of law-
suits in different jurisdictions, seems unlikely to resolve the 
question of campus climate.68 That means that we are left with 
(a) talking with each other; and (b) struggle—including nonvio-
lent demonstrations, teach-ins, and other actions by which one 
side tries to persuade the other of the righteousness of its 
cause.69 If so, that conversation should be as open as possible. 
We should adopt the smallest number of strictures,70 so as to 
enable each side to argue its case in its full complexity, as it 
 
 67. See David A. Graham, The Wrong Side ‘of the Right Side of History,’ 
THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2015/12/obama-right-side-of-history/420462 (attributing the much-quoted 
phrase to Martin Luther King, Jr.). 
 68. See GOULD, supra note 19, at 123–48. 
 69. Usually this means the weaker side (the students and their defenders) 
trying to persuade the conservative right and their defenders. See, e.g., Susan 
Brown, How One University Took Its Student Protestors Seriously, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 25, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Video-How 
-One-University-Took/235834?cid=cp29 (interviewing Ajay Nair, dean of cam-
pus life at Emory University, about racial climate protests at Emory). 
 70. That is, rules of evidence, presumptions that fall heavily on one side 
or the other, and—in interpersonal exchanges—the accusation that one’s ad-
versary is merely engaging in political correctness. 
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sees it, to the other side and the public at large.71 As we write, 
society is of two minds about diversity, campus climate, ethnic 
studies departments, and affirmative action. The composition 
of the citizenry is changing, and American politics is in transi-
tion as well. We have little idea how we will feel about campus 
programs in ten or twenty years. In such a situation, what 
Laurence Tribe called structural due process argues for keeping 
an open mind, not pressing for a final judicial interpretation, 
and not running either group off campus in contempt.72 Many 
campus administrators seem to be acting, consciously or uncon-
sciously, with this precept in mind.73 
B. A FURTHER ADMONITION FOR FREE-SPEECH ADHERENTS: 
FREE SPEECH FORMALISM IS PASSING INTO HISTORY 
Since one of the two sides (the free speech one) is more apt 
than the other to ignore our admonition—perhaps because they 
realize that case law is currently on their side—we close on a 
personal note. Elsewhere, we have outlined our case that legal 
realism is likely to arrive in the First Amendment area rela-
tively soon.74 It is the one remaining redoubt, and its defenders 
are unlikely to be able to hold on much longer: realism is, simp-
ly, the better option when considering almost any legal rule or 
practice. 
Moreover, for most lawyers, legal formalism is a joyless ex-
ercise.75 In a recent book and article, we show that this is so 
 
 71. See Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 269, 304–06 (1975). 
 72. Id. at 302–03, 306. 
 73. See, e.g., Katherine Knott, What Should Colleges Do To Discipline 
Students Who Spew Hate?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www 
.chronicle.com/article/What-Should-Colleges-Do-to/237942 (advocating that the 
two sides talk with each other); Katherine Mangan, A Gorilla-Masked Stu-
dent’s Attempt To Provoke Is Met with Peace, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 3, 
2016), http://www.chronicle.com/article/A-Gorilla-Masked-Student-s/237964 
(approving of same); Stone, supra note 2 (same). 
 74. See Delgado, Giving Way, supra note 34; Delgado, Legal Realist View, 
supra note 34, at 779, 798–802; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 39, at 354–58. 
On the broad movement away from formalism as an explanation for judging 
and legal reasoning, see for example, Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurispru-
dence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 453–54 (1930) (arguing for a 
non-categorical approach to legal reasoning and positing that legal arguments 
that proceed merely by placing cases in one’s favorite category are suspect); 
Tushnet, supra note 33, at 1384–94. 
 75. See JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, HOW LAWYERS LOSE 
THEIR WAY: A PROFESSION FAILS ITS CREATIVE MINDS 48–51 (2005). 
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and that during periods when legal formalism reigns, lawyers 
tend to be notably unhappy.76 The dominant epistemology rec-
reates itself in law-office management, so that the work be-
comes time-pressured, highly regimented, and dull.77 As we put 
it, if you agree to think like a machine, someone is likely to 
come along and make you work like one.78 This is not just coin-
cidental. A highly constrained way of thinking and working is 
apt to lead to regimentation in the circumstances in which one 
conducts the work.79 For most lawyers (indeed, human beings), 
these are prescriptions for stress, drug-taking, marital unhap-
piness, and depression, maladies that myriad studies have 
shown afflict the legal profession to a much higher degree than 
they do most other professions.80 
Today, however, we add a new reason for eschewing legal 
formalism whenever possible: it limits your intellectual options. 
It makes you less smart and less flexible than you ordinarily 
are and a poor lawyer. Lawyers who learn to reason, write, and 
argue like a hornbook full of black-letter law are apt to perform 
inadequately, particularly on key occasions. Consider a few ex-
amples of how this can happen. 
Recently, a law school clinic engaged a prominent constitu-
tional lawyer to attempt to reverse an adverse trial court ruling 
in an important case having to do with the educational pro-
spects of minority children in a major city. In Arce v. Douglas,81 
the lawyer found himself arguing before the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in an effort to reverse a trial court ruling that 
 
 76. Id. at 61; see also Richard Delgado, Recent Writing on Law and Hap-
piness, 97 IOWA L. REV. 913, 928 (2012). Other professions are beginning to 
reject formalism, with similar results. See, e.g., STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra 
note 75, at 72–76 (noting how many physicians dislike managed care regimes 
that require them to spend hours filling out code numbers on insurance forms 
or haggling with insurance companies over a course of treatment they pre-
scribed for a patient). Many academics dislike the new accountability forms 
that require them to submit lesson plans or fill out monthly forms reporting 
how much time they spent on particular activities. See, e.g., id. at 51 (discuss-
ing the effects of formalism on those in academia). 
 77. STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 75, at 47–61. 
 78. Id. at 77–80. 
 79. That is, the work is apt to assume a high degree of specialization and 
be carried out in an authoritarian atmosphere with intense competition for the 
best assignments and partnerships, and an emphasis on rain-making and bill-
able hours. Id. at 39, 64, 77–80. 
 80. Id. at 47–53. 
 81. 793 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2015). The trial court opinion, which the lawyer 
was trying his best to reverse, is Acosta v. Huppenthal, No. CV 10–623–TUC–
AWT, 2013 WL 871892 (D. Ariz. Mar. 8, 2013). 
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a program of Mexican American Studies in Tucson, Arizona, 
public schools violated Arizona law.82 The innovative program 
had been both popular and successful.83 But in the minds of au-
thorities in the state capital, it taught the students radical 
thoughts and ideas and contravened a hastily drafted law pro-
hibiting any such course of instruction.84 
As though he were mentally reviewing his own constitu-
tional treatise, the lawyer tried this line of authority, then that, 
getting nowhere.85 A video of the argument showed the faces 
and demeanor of the appellate judges, who were visibly sympa-
thetic with the students deprived of an opportunity to receive 
stimulating instruction with culturally relevant materials but 
increasingly frustrated with the lawyer’s inability to give them 
a plausible ground for finding in their favor.86 A number of the 
judges asked whether the case did not reek of racial animus.87 
The lawyer avoided the question as though he found it distaste-
ful. The court ended up by remanding the case for retrial (be-
fore the same hostile judge who had given it short shrift earli-
er) on a narrow, and not very promising, ground.88 The lawyer 
probably left believing he did the best anyone could have done. 
What was needed, of course, was a non-formalist approach 
that included considerations of the unique pedagogical signifi-
cance of the course in question in light of adolescent psychology 
and development theory, and an unflinching review of the cul-
tural battle raging in Arizona over immigrant rights and public 
education. Almost any educated journalist, social science teach-
er, or sympathetic minister could have provided the material 
that the judges were seemingly looking for.89 But of course, 
 
 82. For the history of the controversy, see Richard Delgado, Precious 
Knowledge: State Bans on Ethnic Studies, Book Traffickers (Librotraficantes), 
and a New Type of Race Trial, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1513 (2013). 
 83. Id. at 1527–30. 
 84. See id. at 1521–22 (discussing the statute, which prohibited courses of 
instruction that catered to one ethnic group only, that aimed to enhance racial 
solidarity rather than to treat students as individuals, that stirred racial re-
sentment, or that aimed to overthrow the U.S. government). 
 85. See Maya Arce v. John Huppenthal Oral Argument, C-SPAN (Jan. 12, 
2005), https://www.c-span.org/video/?323730-1/maya-arce-v-john-huppenthal 
-oral-argument. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. 
 88. To wit, the court’s decision turned on the question of whether Arizo-
na’s discontinuation of the program violated legislative due process. See Arce 
v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 985–90 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 89. See, e.g., Sheen S. Levine & David Stark, Opinion, Diversity Makes 
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those arguments were nowhere to be found in First Amend-
ment case law concerning socialist party agitators90 or owners 
of movie theater chains wishing to operate a pornographic the-
atre in a residential neighborhood.91 
In a second example, the Chronicle of Higher Education re-
cently reported that a prominent legal scholar is planning to 
leave law teaching for a career as both student and visiting 
scholar at Union Theological Seminary.92 The scholar, who re-
cently published a much-admired book comparing America’s 
current imprisonment crisis, which includes the large number 
of African American men locked away for long terms, to a new 
Jim Crow, was at the top of her game, her book having glowing 
reviews and sold innumerable copies.93 Instead of basking in 
newfound glory, however, the author had decided to call quits 
to her law-teaching career. Prime among her listed reasons was 
her inability to stimulate a productive conversation about race 
and justice within the confines of that discipline.94 To conduct a 
deep, more meaningful analysis of social problems and issues, 
she concluded, one needed to abandon law and doctrine, with 
its strait jackets limiting what one can think and say, and how 
one can reason, and seek broader intellectual horizons.95 
A final example of how legal formalism and doctrinal 
teaching can stultify one’s intellectual and imaginative powers 
stems from our own recent teaching of an innovative course at 
a top law school.96 Entitled Practicum: Lawyers and Social 
Change, the course attracts some of the most adventurous and 
intellectually advanced members of the student body. But in a 
 
You Brighter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2015, at A35 (“When surrounded by people 
‘like ourselves,’ we are easily influenced, more likely to fall for wrong ideas. 
Diversity prompts better, critical thinking. It contributes to error detection. It 
keeps us from drifting toward miscalculation.”). 
 90. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing mem-
bers of the National Socialist party challenging local ordinances prohibiting 
their conduct). 
 91. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (dis-
cussing locating an adult motion picture theatre in a residential neighbor-
hood). 
 92. See Alexander C. Kafka, A Prominent Scholar-Activist Trades Law for 
the Seminary, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.chronicle 
.com/article/A-Prominent-Scholar-Activist/237869. 
 93. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERA-
TION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012). 
 94. See Kafka, supra note 92. 
 95. See ALEXANDER, supra note 93; Kafka, supra note 92. 
 96. Specifically, the University of Alabama School of Law. 
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discussion of the abovementioned Tucson case,97 the students 
could not think of how a theory of surplus educational value, 
similar to Marx’s famous one explaining labor and market con-
tradictions,98 could apply to the predicament of Mexican Ameri-
can students confronting obstinate authorities in the capital.99 
The students could see that something was wrong in what the 
authorities had done and that it was likely, ultimately, to fail, 
but instinctively searched for a solution in First Amendment 
doctrines such as the right to receive information or case law 
forbidding censorship in library collection policy, that they 
could see would be unavailing—in short, in the very doctrines 
that the famous constitutional lawyer employed unsuccessfully 
in the actual case.100 Their education to that point had not 
taught them to think sufficiently flexibly.101 
Indeed, formalistic First Amendment reasoning can, ironi-
cally, lead to failure to protect speech as fully as it should be in 
situations that would seem to call for the highest level of pro-
tection, such as book-banning. Consider how, in the Tucson 
case mentioned above,102 local school authorities, fearing that 
the legislature would cut off their funding, not only discontin-
ued the much-loved program—they sent staff to the classroom 
where energetic young teachers had taught hungry young Mex-
ican American children about their own history and culture.103 
There, in front of crying students and surrounded by colorful 
 
 97. Which we billed as an example of a legal problem requiring outside-
the-box analysis and lawyering. See supra notes 81–88 and accompanying 
text. 
 98. See 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 270–80 (Ben Fowkes trans., Vintage Books 
1st ed. 1977) (1867) (explaining his theory of labor surplus value, in which 
workers in a capitalist system are not the owners of the means of production 
but produce goods or services that the owner sells for a higher price than the 
sum he or she pays the workers, thus reaping a profit that the workers do not 
enjoy). 
 99. The parallel in question would note how school authorities cannot eas-
ily limit education to that which is practical and job-oriented. See, e.g., Rich-
ard Delgado, Liberal McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical Race Theory, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 1505, 1509–10 (2009) (discussing this contradiction as a counter-
part to Marx’s famous version). 
 100. See supra notes 81–88 and accompanying text. 
 101. Law school exams, which are time-pressured and cover an entire 
term’s work, may contribute to some students’ fixation on blackletter rules of 
the type found in legal outlines and hornbooks, which can serve as security 
blankets for the harried and the overworked. 
 102. See supra notes 81–88 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Delgado, supra note 82, at 1523. 
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posters, Aztec designs, calendars, rugs, and slogans,104 they 
boxed up the texts that the classes had been using, including 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest,105 Howard Zinn’s A People’s History 
of the United States,106 Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Op-
pressed,107 Rodolfo Acuña’s Occupied America: A History of Chi-
canos,108 Sandra Cisneros’s The House on Mango Street,109 and 
two books by the current authors.110 They then trundled the 
boxes of books to trucks for transportation to a storage facility 
outside of town.111 
As mentioned, the ACLU and other free-speech organiza-
tions were nowhere to be found. The state’s actions were a clas-
sic case of censorship, reminiscent of past struggles over Ulys-
ses,112 Lady Chatterley’s Lover,113 or the poem, Howl.114 Might 
this remarkable silence have stemmed, ironically, from the very 
inflexibility of current First Amendment doctrine? For, if you 
agree to conceive of speech as a pristine value, everywhere pro-
tected and not subject to balancing, you will need to find some 
way to account for the dozens of “exceptions” that riddle your 
favorite value—words of threat, defamation, libel, copyright, 
plagiarism, false advertising, untrue words uttered under oath, 
 
 104. See PRECIOUS KNOWLEDGE (Dos Vatos Productions 2011). 
 105. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST (Bantam Books 2006). 
 106. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (Harper 
Perennial Modern Classics 2005). 
 107. PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (Myra Bergman Ramos 
trans., Bloomsbury Publishing 30th anniversary ed. 2000) (1968). 
 108. RODOLFO ACUÑA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS (8th 
ed. 2014). 
 109. SANDRA CISNEROS, THE HOUSE ON MANGO STREET (Vintage Contem-
poraries 1991). 
 110. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION (3d ed. 2017); THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER 
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
 111. See Jeff Biggers, Who’s Afraid of “The Tempest”?, SALON (Jan. 13, 
2012), http://www.salon.com/2012/01/13/whos_afraid_of_the_tempest (describ-
ing Tucson Unified School District’s book ban); Debbie Reese, A Copy of Tuc-
son’s Banned Book List, NEWS TACO (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www 
.newstaco.com/2012/01/31/a-copy-of-tucsons-banned-book-list (reproducing 
Tucson Unified School District’s banned book list). 
 112. JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES (Wordsworth Classics 2010). 
 113. D.H. LAWRENCE, LADY CHATTERLEY’S LOVER (Wordsworth Classics 
2005). 
 114. See, e.g., RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, MANIA: THE 
STORY OF THE OUTRAGED & OUTRAGEOUS LIVES THAT LAUNCHED A CULTURAL 
REVOLUTION (2013) (describing censorship in the United States, culminating 
in the trial of poet Allen Ginsberg’s bookseller for selling Ginsberg’s allegedly 
obscene book, GINSBERG, HOWL, AND OTHER POEMS (1956)). 
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disrespectful language hurled at a judge, police officer, or other 
authority figures, and many others.115 This way of proceeding 
will make it easy to sacrifice your core value in a new case, 
since your reaction can easily be that, surely, there must be an 
exception—somewhere—for such a pressing matter as the one 
before you. Outright censorship, as in Tucson, becomes a mere 
case of curricular modification, for example. The reason for the 
real loss of First Amendment liberty in such cases resides in 
the habit of First Amendment formalism. We create, in our im-
agination, a pristine field, namely speech, with no balancing—
except, of course, for those pesky exceptions that we don’t like 
to talk about. The dangers inherent in such a way of proceeding 
should be obvious. 
C. FLEXIBILITY ISN’T EVERYTHING: A PARTING ADMONITION FOR 
THE CAMPUS-CLIMATE CROWD 
Although we believe that it is the opponents of campus re-
forms who are most in need of introspection, we should note 
that our friends in the multicultural movement need to realize 
the limitations of some of their favorite forms of argument as 
well. In particular, not every colorable argument in favor of an 
improvement in campus climate is likely to be seen as a legal 
argument. They should stop making them to lawyers or even 
people who think like lawyers, as many campus administrators 
do. 
To see this, imagine that one encountered a book profess-
ing to be a treatise on patent law that opened by declaring, on 
page one, that all inventions belonged to the world and ought to 
be available to everyone for free. One might reply that the book 
isn’t a patent law treatise at all, but perhaps a fantasy. The 
point is that not all arguments are legal arguments. To be seen 
as such, they must be grounded in premises that are recogniza-
bly legal and part of the legal tradition. Merely saying “the 
campus must change in such-and-such a respect in order that I 
and my friends will feel comfortable there” is not a legal, or 
even a very good policy argument. One needs to explain why 
the reform is sensible, not too costly, and will not damage other 
values and practices that the campus holds dear. One needs to 
show that the reform will not collide with other measures and 
practices that we rely on to run a campus. 
 
 115. See, e.g., Delgado, Legal Realist View, supra note 34, at 794 (discuss-
ing many of these exceptions). 
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Notions of what is an acceptable argument are constantly 
in transition, but that transition is usually measured and or-
derly. A treatise on the law of property written in 1700 that de-
clared that human beings could not belong to others as slaves 
would have struck most readers then as absurd—as not-law. 
That perception, of course, changed. By the same token, a chap-
ter in a contemporary engineering book that began by propos-
ing a new approach to bridge building—suggesting, perhaps, 
that bridges over 800 feet long are too expensive and dangerous 
in high winds and that society should consider investing in un-
derwater tunnels instead—would probably not meet such cava-
lier rejection (“that’s not engineering”). Readers would instead 
consider the substance of the author’s suggestion and arrive at 
their own conclusion. The reason is that the engineering sug-
gestion engages and draws on familiar ideas in the world of en-
gineering—cost, safety, available alternatives. 
The realists, then, should bear in mind that with the cam-
pus-climate debate, they should deploy arguments in light of 
the times and the setting against which they will be received 
and evaluated. Otherwise they will bear as much responsibility 
for the ensuing deadlock as formalists who recite a favorite 
case116 and declare the matter closed. 
  CONCLUSION: ESCAPING PROFESSOR KINGSFIELD’S 
TRAP   
In the movie The Paper Chase, Professor Kingsfield, the es-
teemed but much-feared contracts professor, announces that 
“[w]e do brain surgery here. . . . You come in here with a skull 
full of mush, and you leave thinking like a lawyer.”117 Unfortu-
nately, legal education that exalts doctrine above all can leave 
a student with the impression that law consists almost entirely 
of a mass of rules governing the fields of contracts, torts, civil 
procedure, criminal law, property, and a few second- and third-
year subjects that build on them. Lawyers trained in that fash-
ion and who do not later surmount it have essentially under-
gone a lobotomy. Part of their intellectual apparatus that would 
ordinarily govern flexibility and the ability to respond effective-
ly to new challenges vanishes. Lawyers who approach campus 
 
 116. E.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that public 
officials suing a newspaper for defamation must show that the newspaper was 
guilty of actual malice). 
 117. THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973). 
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climate issues armed with such a withered intellectual reper-
toire are unlikely to carry out helpful roles. They are much 
more likely to impede progress and do real harm. 
Perhaps that is why campus administrators bent on solv-
ing real-life problems instinctively turn somewhere else. Law-
yers seeking to be helpful agents during troubled times must 
adopt the intellectual tools and modes of discourse that will en-
able them to carry out the historic role that many have per-
formed in the past.118 
 
 118. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST 
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (2004) (detailing the litigation strategy 
of the NAACP’s fight against segregated education and the legal skills of staff 
members that led to the success of public interest law). 
